Brian Krebs has done his usual excellent job outlining the Microsoft takedown of the Rustock botnet. Because of the resiliency of the architecture, a combination of technical and legal maneuvers were employed to seize the control structure of the botnet and render the compromised clients ineffective.
VoIP Encryption Vulnerability
March 22, 2011It’s a well-known fact that conversations using Voice-over-IP (VoIP) technologies need to be encrypted to ensure privacy; after all, tools like Wireshark offer special modes for reconstructing a phone conversation from a packet capture. But according to this paper (warning: PDF file), encryption might not be enough.
From the paper abstract:
Despite the rapid adoption of Voice over IP
(VoIP), its security implications are not yet fully un-
derstood. Since VoIP calls may traverse untrusted
networks, packets should be encrypted to ensure
confidentiality. However, we show that when the
audio is encoded using variable bit rate codecs, the
lengths of encrypted VoIP packets can be used to
identify the phrases spoken within a call. Our re-
sults indicate that a passive observer can identify
phrases from a standard speech corpus within en-
crypted calls with an average accuracy of 50%, and
with accuracy greater than 90% for some phrases.
Clearly, such an attack calls into question the effi-
cacy of current VoIP encryption standards. In ad-
dition, we examine the impact of various features of
the underlying audio on our performance and dis-
cuss methods for mitigation.
Definition Monday: Defense In Depth
March 21, 2011Welcome to Definition Monday, where we define and explain a common technology or security concept for the benefit of our less experienced readers. This week: Defense In Depth.
There was a time, when the Internet was young and optimistic and not nearly so hostile as it is now, when the main defense of an Internet connected site was a single simple firewall at the network border.
Of course, this was also a time when the majority of users had a dumb terminal, if anything, that remained on their desk and the data that they worked with was on a DEC VAX or some other minicomputer maintained by the high priests of the IT department.
Those days are long, long gone.
Defense In Depth refers to an information security strategy where multiple redundant layers of defense are using to protect information assets. This strategy can mitigate technology failures, vendor-specific exploits, and multiple attack vectors that simply could not be handled by a single layer of defense.
For example, consider a Windows workstation in the controller’s office of your business. The network as a whole is probably protected by at least one firewall. There is likely a router in between this workstation and the Internet as well, which has its own abilities to accept or deny traffic. An Intrusion Detection System may be monitoring the traffic between the Internet and the computers in the controller’s department, watching for signs of attack or compromise. Finally, the machine itself is probably running a host-based firewall (either the Microsoft-supplied one that comes with Windows or a third-party installation), virus scanner, adware scanner, and so on. The thought is that if a threat manages to get past the border firewall, it still needs to get past the other measures in place before data can be compromised.
Another example – most companies run different virus detection packages on their mail server and their workstations, despite the fact that the licensing is often more expensive than just running one in both places. Why do this? Because if a virus can elude one of those packages but not the other, it will still be stopped. But an antivirus monoculture has no such built-in safeguards.
Two things to keep in mind when deploying a Defense In Depth strategy:
- Consider mixing vendors, or at least mixing up product lines and operating systems among a single vendor’s offerings. Imagine that your office is an all-Cisco shop, from the firewall to the core routing to the wireless network. Now imagine that a new vulnerability is discovered, specific to Cisco embedded operating systems, that allows for traffic to be exfiltrated without tripping any sensors. You’re going to be a lot more vulnerable than someone who sprinkled in some snort boxes, Vyatta routers, or some other non-Cisco equipment when designing the network.
- Employing proper Defense In Depth can be expensive, especially if you go with a multi-vendor approach. It means buying multiple products with overlapping functionality. It means juggling more physical hardware. It means justifying purchasing new equipment rather than repurposing old stuff to cover a functional hole. It’s an expense that can be difficult to justify because the return on investment is not clear to the layman – but it is vitally important to make the case.
In the modern information environment, where network borders are fuzzy, where corporate data is showing up on personally owned laptops and smartphones, where people might be using their work laptop to help with their kids’ homework, the old “hard outside and a chewy center” model of a single network firewall at the office just doesn’t cut it any more. Defense In Depth is an important concept to remember when implementing your policies and technologies.
Flash Vulnerability
March 18, 2011Sometimes I feel like there should be a category on here specific to Adobe Flash vulnerabilities. It seems to leak like a sieve.
Well, here’s another one. The Flash plugin can be exploited by an attacker to run arbitrary code or cause a DoS condition. A fix is expected next week; disabling Flash in your browser this week might be a smart move.
RSA Hacked
March 18, 2011It appears that RSA – yes, that RSA, the demigods of security – has been hacked.
An APT attack was used to exfiltrate information related to their SecureID multifactor authentication products. While they don’t think that it was information that could lead to a successful breaking of the product’s capabilities, it might make an attack simpler. Details will be forthcoming to SecureID customers.
Automotive Security Holes
March 14, 2011Researchers at UCSD and University of Washington have released a paper on finding remote vulnerabilities in automotive computer systems. Though the simplest method is still to use the automotive data interface, there are also exploitable holes in the cellular network interface, bluetooth network interfaces, and even the car stereo system.
From the article:
But their most interesting attack focused on the car stereo. By adding extra code to a digital music file, they were able to turn a song burned to CD into a Trojan horse. When played on the car’s stereo, this song could alter the firmware of the car’s stereo system, giving attackers an entry point to change other components on the car. This type of attack could be spread on file-sharing networks without arousing suspicion, they believe. “It’s hard to think of something more innocuous than a song,” said Stefan Savage, a professor at the University of California.
Adding computers to things also adds security implications. It’s too bad that this is not better understood in the world of product development.
Secondhand Data
March 14, 2011The State of New Jersey very nearly auctioned off dozens of computers containing sensitive data – and they almost certainly have done so in the past. This was the first time that the state comptroller’s office thought to look at the disposition of the equipment that was to be auctioned.
If your company is looked to get rid of old equipment, it is imperative that you check it for data first. This includes desktops and laptops, of course, but also devices like networked printers or fax servers that may contain a hard drive. For wiping data and leaving the drive usable by the buyer, I recommend DBAN. If that drive doesn’t need to be usable in the future, I suggest one of these, or perhaps a giant hammer.
Disabling GSM Phones With SMS
March 11, 2011Researchers at CanSecWest gave a presentation this week on disabling various GSM phones using only SMS messaging. OpenBSC, an open source toolkit, was used to build a custom GSM network and the SMS messages were generated using it. Phones could be frozen, rebooted, locked, even completely bricked.
From one of the comments on the article:
It’s actually pretty well known –has been known for a while, too– that handsets are mostly tested against the few types of base stations Out There and, er, that’s it. Malicious input checking? Never needed; all the base stations are made by just a few manufacturers, right? Right?
Well, that’s what OpenBSC changed. Phones are still back where computers were back in the eighties. And now we can poke at them. There’s more where this came from. Far more.
The Current State of Cyberwar
March 9, 2011An excellent article in the CS Monitor, discussing the current state of cyberwar and how it differs from conventional warfare and its doctrines. Not a lot of new material for those of us who work in the field, but an excellent summation for the layman.
Wells Fargo BYOH
March 8, 2011At the end of January, I wrote about the current trend in allowing users to bring their own hardware into an enterprise environment. Some companies are allowing personally owned smartphones and tablets, for example, to connect to their enterprise network. This both makes employees happy and saves the company money.
Other companies are not allowing this. Wells Fargo, for one.
From the article:
“I carry two phones. One for personal, and one for work,” says Martin Davis, executive vice president and head of Wells Fargo’s technology integration office. “I’ve got two iPads in my briefcase, for personal and work. We keep it separate.”
I like the way he thinks.